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THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE'S MANDATORY
WAIVER OF CONFIDENTIALITY-THE PRACTICAL
AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEFECTS
INTRODUCTION
On December 10, 1974, the Internal Revenue Service published
a set of proposed procedural amendments' to the present require-
ments for obtaining a private letter ruling.2 These proposed
amendments read in part:
A request for ruling or determination letter ... must also contain
... [a] waiver of confidential treatment .... The waiver of con-
fidential treatment... shall be made by written statement in the
request signed by or for the person making the request and all
other persons whom the Internal Revenue Service shall determine
may have a direct interest in maintaining the confidentiality of in-
formation in the request. The waiver shall state that each such
person expressly waives any right to confidential treatment with
respect to the request, all information and correspondence in con-
nection with the request, all information contained in the ruling,
determination letter or acknowledgement of withdrawal issued, and
all other materials included in the file connected with the request,
the ruling, the determination letter or acknowledgement of with-
drawal.3
The ramifications of such a condition precedent affect both the
viability of the letter rulings program and the personal privacy of
the taxpayer. The practical effects of this requirement upon the
letter rulings program and the constitutionality of requiring tax-
payers who request rulings to leave their personal financial records
1. Proposed amendments to 26 C.F.R. §§ 601.201, 601.702, 601.703, 39
Fed. Reg. 43087 (1974).
2. A private letter ruling is an advance determination of the tax conse-
quences of a proposed transaction. Letter rulings are issued by the Internal
Revenue Service pursuant to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7805(a); 26 C.F.R.
§ 601.201(a) (2) (1972); Rev. Proc. 3, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 698. See generally
J. CHOMMIR, THE INsmNAL REvm= SERVIcE 192-96 (1970); Rogovin, The
Four R's: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity, 43 TAXES 756,
763-70 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Rogovin]; Sugarman, Federal Tax Rul-
ings Procedure, 10 TAx L. REv. 1 (1954).
3. Proposed 26 C.F.R. §§ 601.201(e) (16) (i) and (17) (i), 39 Fed. Reg.
43087, 43088 (1974).
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The Service proposed the' procedural amendments as part of a
new policy4 Of disclosure in compliance with the Freedom of In-
formation Act.5 Faced with increasing pressure from the courts,
Congress, 7 and the commentators8 to disclose private letter rulings
to the public, the Service responded with an abrupt turnabout to
a long-established policy 9 of guaranteeing confidentiality of both
4. News Release, IR-1409, August 9, 1974, -in P-H 1974 FED. TAXES
M55,359.
5. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). See generally Suscoiv. ON ADwIISTRATIVE
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF SENATE COMv. ON TM JUDICARY, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT SOURCE Boom: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES, ARTICLES,
S. Doc. No. 82, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). See also the recent amendments
to 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)' in 13 'U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6881 (1975);
12 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5758 (1974).
6. See Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Internal 'Revenue Service, 505
Adv. F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974), modifying 362 F. Supp. 1298 (D.D.C. 1973).
The court of appeals held that the Service 'must disclose all past letter rul-
ings which do not fall within the exemptions to the Freedom of Information
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1)-(9) (1970). The district court case is noted in
7 IND. L. REV. 416 (1973) and 1974 Wisc. L. REV. 227. Tax Analysts has
been credited as being the primary motivation behind the Service's pro-
posed requirement of a mandatory waiver of confidentiality. See 42 J. TAX.
104 (1975); however, congressional pressure also appears to have been an
important factor. See authorities cited note 7 infra.
7. See, e.g., Hearings on Internal Revenue Service Disclosure Policies
Before Subcomm. of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(July 31, 1974), cited in BNA TAX MGmT. MEm. 3, 6 (No. 22, 1974); 111 Cong.
Rec. 11810 (1965) (remarks of Senator Gore); SuBcomvm. ON ADumIsTRA-
TION OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAws OF HOUSE CoImvI. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
82d Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON INTERNAL REVENUE INVESTIGATION
(Subcomm. Print 1952). Questioning of Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Donald C. Alexander by Senator Edward Kennedy apparently also influ-
enced the Service's decision to propose the mandatory waiver provision.
BNA TAX MGmT. MEm. 3, 6 (No. 22, 1974).
8. See Stone, Public Hearings for Private Rulings-Four Recommenda-
tions, in TAXATION wIm REPRESENTATION, COMvrPENDIUiv ON THE PuBLIC AND
THE RumG PROCESS 72-143 (1972); Reid, Public Access to InternaZ Reve-
nue Service Rulings, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 23 (1972); Note, Public Disclos-
ure of Internal Revenue Letter Rulings, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 832 (1973). [here-
inafter cited as U. CI. Note]- Some authors feel that the issuing of any
private letter rulings by the Service is basically unfair. See Kragen, The
Private Ruling: An Anomaly of Our Internal Revenue System, 45 TAXES
331 (1967). This Comment, while not exploring the issue in depth, takes
the position that disclosure of letter rulings is desirable only if the confi-
dentiality of the financial information contained in the rulings and the re-
quests for ruling is not compromised.
9. The Service formerly took the position that private letter rulings
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the information submitted in the request for ruling and the letter
ruling itself.
The authority for such a reversal can be found in an obscure por-
tion of the regulations'0 which the Service enacted in 1967 to imple-
ment the newly passed Freedom of Information Act." Although the
Act itself provides nine specific exemptions' 2 to disclosure, the
Service has taken the position that
were nondisclosable because they were not precedential, i.e., only the tax-
payer to whom the ruling was issued could rely upon it. See 26 C.F.R.
§ 601.201(1) (1) (1972); Caplin, Taxpayer Rulings Policy of the Internal
Revenue Service: A Statement of Principles, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 1, 22 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Caplin]. An additional Service con-
tention was that nondisclosure of rulings was required by INT. REv. CODE
OF 1954, §§ 6103 (a) (1) and 7213 (a) (1) which prohibit disclosure of informa-
tion contained in income tax returns. Both contentions were dismissed in
Tax Analysts and Advocates v. IRS, 505 Adv. F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
As to the precedential value of letter rulings, compare Hanover Bank v.
Comm'r, 369 U.S. 672, 686 (1962) with International Business Mach. Corp.
v. United States, 343 F.2d 914, 919-24 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
10. 26 C.F.R. § 601.701(b) (3) (1972).
11. The Service, like other administrative agencies, was forced to ex-
tensively revise its disclosure proceedings in order to comply with the Free-
dom of Information Act. 26 C.F.R. §§ 601.601-702 (1972) are the result. See
generally Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations,
56 GEo. L.J. 18, 54-57 (1967).
12. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) reads as follows:
This section [requiring disclosure] does not apply to matters that
are-
(1) specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in
the interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices,
of an agency;
(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information ob-
tained from a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which
would not be available by law to a party other than an agency
in litigation with the agency;
(6) personnel and medical files or similar files the disclosure of
which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes
except to the extent available by law to a party other than an
agency;
(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condi-
tion reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency
responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institu-
tions; or
(9) geological or geophysical information and data, including
maps, concerning wells.
The exemptions applicable to the information contained in requests for rul-
ings are the (b) (4) exemption relating to commercial or financial informa-
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[e]ven though an exemption... may be fully applicable to a mat-
ter in a particular case, the Internal Revenue Service may, if not
precluded by law, elect under the circumstances of that case not
to apply the exemption to such matter.'8
While this apparently contradicts the legislative intent behind the
exemptions, 14 Professor Kenneth Culp Davis' analysis of the pur-
pose of the Freedom of Information Act 1 strongly supports the
Service's position:
The Act contains no provision forbidding disclosure. It requires
disclosure of all records except what is 'specifically' within the nine
exemptions and other provisions. The exemptions protect against
required disclosure, not against disclosure. The Act leaves officers
free to disclose or withhold records covered by the exemptions, but
they may then be governed by other statutory law, by the common
law, by executive privilege, by executive order, or by agency-made
law in the form of regulations, orders, or instructions.' 0
Thus exists the anomaly that an agency may rely on the statutory
exemptions in denying disclosure, but the person most directly af-
fected, the submitter of the information, has no recourse in the
Freedom of Information Act for resisting disclosure.' 7
Importance of Letter Rulings
Letter rulings play a significant role in both the business plan-
tion and possibly the (b) (6) exemption relating to invasions of personal
privacy. See also Note, Public Disclosure of Confidential Business Infor-
mation Under the Freedom of Information Act: Toward a More Objective
Standard, 60 CoRNELL L. REv. 109 (1974); Annot., 21 A.L.R. FED. 224 (1974).
13. 26 C.F.R. § 601.701(b) (3) (1972).
14. For the legislative history behind the exemptions see S. REP. No. 813,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); H.R. RE. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
The Senate version is preferred. The Service intends to honor the "trade
secrets" aspect of the (b) (4) exemption, supra note 12, but to completely
disregard the "commercial or financial information" section of the exemp-
tion. See 39 Fed. Reg. 43087 (1974) where it is stated:
Information is not a trade secret merely because it is commercial
or financial information. Accordingly commercial or financial in-
formation obtained from a person requesting a ruling ... will not
be withheld from public inspection.
15. Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. Cn. L.
Rav. 761 (1967).
16. Id. at 766 (emphasis added).
17. Id. at 765-66, 807-08. Although Professor Davis is a noted authority
in the field of administrative law, the disclosure requirements appear to
be susceptible of a different reading. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1970) states that:
This section does not authorize withholding of information or
limit the availability of records to the public, except as specifically
stated in this section (emphasis added).
This could be interpreted to mean that the exemptions are controlling as
to disclosure. Cf. Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 355 F. Supp. 1171, 1173
(D.D.C. 1973) in which a corporation was allowed to intervene to protect
its interest in nondisclosure.
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ning and tax administration of this country.' 8 Although only 25,000
to 30,000 private rulings are issued per year,19 their influence on
the national economy is quite extensive. 20 By eliminating the risk
of an unforeseen tax result, the letter ruling provides an invaluable
aid in business planning.21 As the financial magnitude of a pro-
posed transaction increases, so do the attendant tax consequences;
thus, in such large transactions as corporate mergers, the advance
determination of the tax effects becomes a virtual necessity.22 Due
to the inherent complexity in applying the Internal Revenue Code,
many transactions would simply not be undertaken without a letter
ruling.23 The continued vitality of the letter rulings program is,
therefore, of legitimate concern to the taxpayer who desires to ef-
fectively plan his economic affairs.
24
18. Caplin, supra note 9, at 1-2, 6-7. The importance of letter rulings
is admitted even by the proponents of full disclosure. Indeed, this seems
to be one of the main reasons for desiring disclosure. See Reid, supra note
8, at 24, 28-29; U. CH. Note, supra note 8, at 833, 835, 837-38.
19. For example, the following number of requests for letter rulings were









See 1973 IRS ANN. REP. 7; 1972 IRS ANN. REP. 5; 1971 IRS ANN. RaP.
8; 1970 IRS ANN. REP. 10; 1969 IRS ANN. REP. 8; 1968 IRS ANN. Rzp. 8;
1967 IRS ANN. REP. 9; 1966 IRS ANN. REP. 6. The figure for 1973 appears
unrepresentative because the Service did not include requests for rulings
on a change of accounting periods, traditionally the most numerous category
of requests.
20. Rogovin, supra note 2, at 764.
21. Caplin, supra note 9, at 7; Sugarman, supra note 2, at 4.
22. Caplin at 7; Sugarman, supra note 2, at 4. This opinion has been
shared by other commentators. See, e.g., Goldberg, Private Rulings on Pro-
posed Transactions Can Give Advance Assurance as to Tax Results, 11 TAx.
FOR Acc. 132 (1973); Rose, The Rulings Program of the Internal Revenue
Service, 35 TAXES 907, 910 (1957); Taylor, Tax Rulings: New Rules and
Procedures, N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ON FED. TAx. 69, 91 (1963).
23. Based on interviews with members of the tax bar of San Diego con-
ducted in January of 1975. Cf. Rogovin at 764. See also note 46 infra.
24. Caplin at 1; Rogovin at 756, 765. The extensive citations to Messrs.
Caplin and Rogovin are dictated by the fact that both individuals were in
a unique position to know. Mr. Caplin was formerly the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue Service, and Mr. Rogovin was formerly Chief Counsel for
the Service.
The Service also has a vested interest in maintaining a viable
rulings program. Former Commissioner of Internal Revenue, Mort-
imer Caplin, has declared that the "[i]ssuance of rulings to tax-
payers is one of the major functions of the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice."25 By enabling the Service to decrease potential litigation and
keep informed about new techniques employed in business trans-
actions, letter rulings are a key element in the orderly administra-
tion of the tax system.26 Additionally, the work of the field agents
may be simplified, for they need only verify the accuracy of the
details of the transaction as proposed in the request for ruling.27
In short, letter rulings greatly expedite business planning and tax
administration.
The importance of the letter ruling is highlighted by the lack
of an effective alternative. Currently, the only possible substitutes
are the closing agreement 28 and the determination letter; 20 how-
ever, both appear incapable of replacing letter rulings. The very
origin of the present rulings program is due to the unworkability
of previous systems, 30 the core of which was the closing agree-
ment.31 Additionally, determination letters would suffer from the
same basic disability as letter rulings-the disclosure requirements
of the proposed amendments.3 2 While the tax bar and the Internal
Revenue Service may someday devise a practical alternative to the
25. Caplin at 1. This opinion is borne out by the number of man-hours
the Service devotes to processing letter rulings. In 1971 approximately
340,000 man-hours were utilized. Reid, supra note 8, at 24 n.6.
26. Caplin at 7; Rogovin at 765. Caplin and Rogovin also argue that tax-
payer confidence in the Service's fair administration of the tax laws is an-
other major benefit of the letter rulings system. However, the proponents
of disclosure seem to have effectively rebutted this argument by pointing
out that nondisclosure of private letter rulings can equally promote tax-
payer suspicions of favoritism and unevenness in tax administration. See,
e.g., Reid, supra note 8, at 25-33.
27. Rogovin, supra note 2, at 765.
28. Issued pursuant to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7121, 26 C.F.R. § 601.201
(a) (7) (1972). See also Rogovin at 770. Closing agreements would be
unaffected by the proposed procedural amendments.
29. Issued pursuant to INT. R.v. CODE OF 1954, § 7805, 26 C.F.R. § 601.201
(a) (2) (1972). See also Rogovin at 770-71.
30. CHOMMIE, supra note 2, at 193; Caplin, supra note 9, at 4-6.
31. Caplin at 4-6. Because a closing agreement cannot be revoked in the
absence of fraud, malfeasance, or material misrepresentation, see 26 C.F.R.
§ 601.201 (a) (7) (1972), the Service would probably devote much more time
to investigating the transaction, thus nullifying the expeditious aspect of
the present ruling process. A letter ruling, on the other hand, may be re-
voked even retroactively, although this is rarely done. See Rev. Proc. 3
§ 13, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 698, 705-06; Note, Retroactive Revocation of Reve-
nue Rulings, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 91 (1967).
32. Proposed amendment to 26 C.F.R. § 601.201, 39 Fed. Reg. 43807
(1974).
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letter rulings system, no such program, or even proposed program,
presently exists.
Information Required by the Service to Obtain a Ruling
In order that the Service may determine the tax consequences
of the proposed transaction, certain information must be submitted
by the taxpayer in the request for ruling.33 This information in-
cludes the specific elements of the transaction, the names of all the
interested parties, and any relevant documents such as financial
statements, contracts or bank loan agreements. 34 The exact nature
of any additional data required to be submitted varies according
to the type of transaction contemplated by the taxpayer. In a re-
quest for a change in accounting method, for example, financial
statements showing the prior method and the effect of the proposed
change must be made available by the taxpayer.3 5
Revenue Ruling 74-296,36 pertaining to the question of whether
or not a contraction of a business qualified as a valid partial liquida-
tion,37 provides an example of just how detailed the required in-
formation must sometimes be. In the request for ruling, the tax-
payer was forced to reveal the complete workings of a failing bus-
iness. These details38 included the profit margins in the various
departments, bad debt analyses, amount of floor space allocated to
various products, number of employees, the amount of inventory,
fixed assets, accounts receivable, and sales volume.
Similar types of confidential data must be submitted for other
types of transactions. 39 If these details were revealed to competi-
33. Rev. Proc. 3, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 698, 701-02.
34. Id.
35. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.442-1(b), 1.446-1(e) (1957). A ruling by the
Commissioner is required by statute for most changes in accounting meth-
ods and all changes of accounting periods. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 442,
446 (e).
36. 1974 INT. Ray. BuLL. No. 25, at 15.
37. INT. Rrv. CODE OF 1954, § 346.
38. Without the request for ruling, it is impossible to state with complete
accuracy what information was actually submitted by the taxpayer. How-
ever, based on discussions with the tax bar of San Diego and an analysis
of the ruling itself, the information that is hypothesized in the text is a
conservative assumption.
39. See, e.g., the checklist of information which must be submitted to ob-
tain a ruling regarding a corporate reorganization. Treas. Reg. § 1.367-1;
Rev. Proc. 23, 1968-1 Cmv. BuLL. 821.
tors, grave injury could result to the taxpayer's business.40 The
irony of the proposed procedural amendments is that even if the
taxpayer did not receive a favorable ruling, all the information con-
tained in the request for ruling would be available to the general
public, including his competitors. 41 Thus, a taxpayer who wishes
to receive a ruling would have to seriously weigh the adverse ef-
fects of possible disclosure against the necessity for obtaining the
ruling.
42
Probable Effects of a Mandatory Waiver of Confidentiality
Since the letter ruling is an essential part of tax administration
and business planning, and no workable alternative to the program
presently exists, it is necessary to examine the possibility that the
mandatory waiver provision will seriously impair the effectiveness
of the letter rulings program.
Present users of the system may elect to proceed with the transac-
tion absent a ruling on the tax consequences. 43 This would be the
case where disclosure of the ruling and the information required
to obtain it is potentially more costly than uncertainty as to tax
consequences, but the transaction itself is a necessity. This failure
to request a ruling could, in turn, lead to increased litigation if the
parties' determination of the tax differs from the Service's-a likely
possibility.44
40. Similar concern was voiced in letters submitted to the Service by
various individuals, organizations, and law firms commenting on the pro-
posed procedural amendments. See, e.g., a letter from Robert Whitemore
to the Internal Revenue Service, January 3, 1975, which states:
Such disclosure would be unfair because it would force the small
businessman, as the price of obtaining tax certainty, to disclose his
confidential financial secrets to his competitors, potential competi-
tors, labor unions, suppliers, and all others with whom he deals
or competes. In the business world, such disclosure can spell fi-
nancial disaster for the small businessman whose competitors, dis-
covering he is hard pressed, act to take advantage of his temporary
financial weakness. Or perhaps larger compames, upon disclosure
of the attractive profits of a smaller company, may become com-
petitors, ultimately forcing the smaller company to sell out or give
up its business. Similarly, financial disclosures are certain to put
management at a serious disadvantage in dealing with collective
bargaining representatives of the company's employees. Id. at 1-2.
41. The proposed procedural amendments make no distinction regarding
disclosure between favorable and unfavorable rulings. 39 Fed. Reg. 43087
(1974).
42. Tax bar interviews, supra note 23.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., letter from individual members of American Bar Associa-
tion's Section on Taxation to Internal Revenue Service, June 10, 1974, where
it is stated:
The proposed regulations will discourage taxpayers from seeking
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In the future, users may submit less detailed information than
is now given in the request for ruling, making an accurate deter-
mination of the tax consequences of the event by the Service much
more difficult, if not impossible. This could give rise to two effects:
increased litigation if auditing agents find discrepancies between
the actual and proposed transaction, and an increased reluctance
on the part of the Service to issue rulings at all because the inform-
ation it receives is simply not trustworthy.4 5
Finally, many transactions might not occur at all without a rul-
ing,46 resulting in a stifling of creativity and growth within the
economic community and an ossification of existing, less-efficient
business methods. Thus, a rather insignificant administrative reg-
ulation could, through a domino effect, end up affecting both the
economy 47 and the public's attitude toward voluntary compliance
with the present tax system.
48
Conjecture is, however, more art than science. Assuming that
none of the preceding possibilities occur, a question remains.
Should the taxpayer be required to waive the ability to restrict
public access to otherwise confidential financial information in or-
der to obtain a letter ruling? The constitutional dimensions of this
question require careful exmination.
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Issues
Two distinct issues emerge when the constitutionality of the pro-
posed procedural amendments is considered. First, is the financial
information submitted in the request for letter rulings constitu-
rulings ... and will promote litigation.., by taxpayers going for-
ward without obtaining a ruling .... Id. at 3.
45. Tax bar interviews, supra note 23.
46. See letter from Machinery and Allied Products Institute to the Inter-
nal Revenue Service, January 17, 1975:
In many other instances, the possible tax consequences of activities
are so significant that taxpayers simply will not proceed with them
without a ruling. Id. at 2.
47. Cf. Caplin, supra note 9, at 1; Rogovin, supra note 2, at 765.
48. See letter from the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants to Internal Revenue Service, January 10, 1975:
[O]ur tax system is based on the concept that each taxpayer as-
sesses his own tax pursuant to the tax laws. This assumes that
each taxpayer, either directly or through his advisor, can obtain ad-
equate knowledge of the laws and their interpretation. Id. at 1.
tionally privileged? That is, would indiscriminate release of such
information to the public violate a person's right to privacy?
Second, assuming that a constitutional privilege attaches to such
information, may the government condition the receipt of a benefit
such as a letter ruling by requiring a waiver of a constitutionally
protected right? The key question, therefore, is whether a constitu-
tional privilege attaches to personal financial information, for if it
does not, there could be no constitutional violation in requiring a
mandatory waiver of confidentiality.
The Right of Privacy
49
The Supreme Court established a constitutional right to privacy
in Griswold v. Connecticut" and has affirmed this holding in sub-
sequent cases.51 However, the exact extent of the right is unclear
because the Court has been determining its application on a situa-
tional or ad hoc basis.52 An additional complicating factor is that
the extent of the right seems to depend, in part, on its constitutional
origin, upon which the Court has been continuously divided.58
Therefore, to determine whether the right of privacy extends to
commercial, financial or economic information, it is necessary to
examine the constitutional origins of the right.
Origins of the Right of Privacy
The Court has ascribed the origin of the right of privacy to pen-
49. A complete, or even summary discussion of the complex nature of
the right to privacy is beyond the scope of this Comment. Only the consti-
tutional nature of the right, as developed by Supreme Court cases and other
sources, will be utilized in the determination of whether economic informa-
tion may be constitutionally privileged. For a more detailed examination
of the conceptual nature of the right to privacy see S. HOFSTADER & G.
HOROWITZ, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 1-16 (1964); A. WEST-q, PRIVACY AND FREE-
DoM 1-63 (1967); Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An
Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964); Fried, Privacy, 77
YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34
(1967); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Shils, Privacy: Its
Constitution and Vicissitudes, 31 LAw & CONTEBM. PROB. 281 (1966). The
seminal article was, of course, Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,
4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
50. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
51. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
52. See Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MIcH. L. REV.
219, 230-33 (1965); Note, Roe and Paris: Does Privacy Have a Principle?,
26 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (1974).
53. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 657, 565 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85
(1965).
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umbral emanations from the specific guarantees to the Bill of
Rights,5 4 the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,55 and
the ninth amendment.5 6 There is a great degree of overlap between
the penumbral, due process,5 7 and ninth amendment analyses be-
cause all ultimately depend on the character of the right to be pro-
tected.58 If the right is deemed fundamental,59 constitutional pro-
tection may be granted under what must be acknowledged as sub-
stantive due process. 60 However, the shadow of Lochner v. New
York 6"' should not stop further inquiry into the matter. That which
is involved in establishing a limited right of economic privacy is
privacy, primarily the privacy of individuals, as opposed to eco-
nomics.62 Since the Court has not hesitated to use the doctrine in
54. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
55. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
56. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (Goldberg, J., con-
curring).
57. The instant situation differs from the Griswold case in that the Fed-
eral government, not the states, has control over the dissemination of the
information contained in letter rulings. This would preclude analysis under
the fourteenth amendment save by analogy to the due process clause of
the fifth amendment. See Barron v. The Mayor and City Council of
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1883).
58. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 492-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring), 500 (Harlan, J., concurring)
(1965).
59. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937); Snyder v. Massachu-
setts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). See also Goodpaster, The Constitution and
Fundamental Rights, 15 ARiz. L. REV. 479, 515-16 (1973).
60. See Tribe, The Supreme Court 1972 Term-Foreward: Toward a
Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1,
5-10 (1973).
61. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). This case represents the epitome of the Court's
previous intrusions into the value-laden realm of social and economic policy
making. The Court has declined to use substantive due process as a basis
for invalidating economic or social legislation in an unbroken string of cases
beginning with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934). See, e.g., Fergu-
son v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
62. While letter rulings deal with the talismanic area of economic mat-
ters, the invasion of privacy generated by disclosure has its greatest effect
on individuals in their private lives. Public corporations are already obli-
gated to disclose much financial information by such laws as the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-78jj (1970). The primary brunt of
the disclosure would fall upon close corporations, partnerships, sole pro-
prietorships and individuals not presently required to disclose. This reveal-
ing of personal wealth would affect the individuals involved by endanger-
ing themselves and their families. See text accompanying note 86 infra.
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other cases63 involving individual rights, albeit interstitially, it
should not do so here if consistency with prior determinations is
desired.
Assuming, therefore, that the initial spectre of Lochnering can
'be overcome, why should the right to economic privacy regarding
personal financial information be considered fundamental?
Fundamentality of a Limited Right of Economic Privacy
1. Penumbral Theory
Under the rationale of Griswold,
[the] specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penum-
bras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance. 4
The amendments which give rise to such "zones of privacy"6 5 are
listed as the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth.6 Several of these
amendments have no application to commercial or financial inform-
ation. For example, the third amendment, regarding the quartering
of soldiers in civilian homes, has no relevance. Likewise, the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination has little bearing
on commercial or financial information submitted voluntarily by
the taxpayer,67 for it is unlikely that one would incriminate oneself
for the mere benefit of obtaining an advance determination of a
tax.68 However, two of the remaining amendments do have ap-
plication to the area in question.
a. First Amendment
Although not specifically mentioned in the amendment itself, a
limited freedom of association is guaranteed under the first amend-
63. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-08 (1964)
and Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-27 (1958) (right to travel); Schware
v. Board of Bar Examiners of New Mexico, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) (right to
practice profession). Contra, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-
82 (1965). The Court draws what appears to be an untenable distinction
between economic and individual rights in the application of substantive
due process. See Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771-74 (1964);
Tribe, supra note 60, at 9-10.
64. 381 U.S. at 484.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. However, the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination has
been severely limited in the area of financial and tax information. See,
e.g., Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911).
68. For the use of the privilege against self-incrimination in regard to
information contained in tax returns, see generally Note, Civil Versus Crim-
inal: Taxpayers' Rights Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 38
Bnoor- L. REv. 130 (1971); 26 VAxw. L. Rv. 350 (1973).
[voL. 12: 889, 1975] Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
ment.0  Commercial or financial data is, in part, the record of these
associations. Information concerning such items as contributions
to political, religious, and other organizations reveals much about
a person-his thoughts, desires and beliefs.70 Information pertain-
ing to creditors and debtors may reveal the source of economic
beneficiaries and personal obligations. Information such as cus-
tomer and shareholder lists also trace economic associations. In
short, commercial or financial information is integrally linked with
personal relationships.
Complete disclosure of these associations to the geieral public
may, in turn, discourage a person from engaging in them. Such
discouragement has been held in similar situations7 ' to be an im-
permissible chilling of first amendment rights and, therefore, un-
constitutional. The chilling effect may not extend to all persons
requesting letter rulings; however, certain politically active in-
dividuals or socially oriented corporations may find that their rights
of association are severely restricted by potential disclosure.7 2
b. Fourth Amendment
Although the government is not engaging in the conventional
search and seizure found in criminal investigations, the fourth
amendment does provide an indication that records of an individ-
ual's personal financial affairs are protected from arbitrary govern-
mental intrusion. There is little doubt that the seizing of an in-
69. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
70. See California Banker's Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 89, 97-99 (1974)
(Douglas, J., dissenting). California Banker's Ass'n gave the Court an op-
portunity to determine whether the right of privacy extended to commercial
information. However, the Court declared that certain individual plaintiffs
lacked standing, precluding a consideration of the privacy issue. 416 U.S.
at 71-76.
71. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (compulsory listing
by teacher of all memberships); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(statute requiring disclosure by organization of membership lists).
72. For example, if the NAACP wished to obtain a letter ruling and was
forced to disclose certain financial information, would that data be available
to persons who were seeking to harm the NAACP by retaliating against
contributors? The situation is one step removed from NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449 (1958), for it may be necessary for the person seeking the infor-
mation to draw inferences from the data rather than being able to directly
ascertain the information desired. However, the danger to associational
rights is equally potent.
dividual's financial records without a warrant or probable cause
would be a violation of the fourth amendment. 73 There is no dif-
ferentiation based on the economic character of the information,
and thus a limited zone of economic privacy is created by the fourth
amendment. It is not readily apparent why this should not be ex-
tended to cover information which is in governmental possession. 4
2. Due Process under the Fifth Amendment
As discussed above,75 the self-incrimination clause of the fifth
amendment is not applicable to the present situation. However,
the due process clause of the fifth amendment does provide a strong
rationale for finding governmental release of private information
to be a violation of fundamental rights.
Keeping personal information confidential may be considered
either an aspect of property 76 or personal liberty77 within the terms
73. See, e.g., Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 477-79 (1965); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 662 (1886). But see California Banker's Ass'n
v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 65-67 (1974) discussed in The Supreme Court, 1973
Term, 88 HARv. L. REv. 41, 188-96 (1974) which held that compulsory record-
keeping requirements did not violate the fourth amendment or due process
rights of banks. 416 U.S. at 65-67. The individual's right to privacy must
be distinguished from the lesser degree of privacy that a corporation pos-
sesses under the fourth amendment. See United States v. Morton Salt Co.,
338 U.S. 632 (1950); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
74. The Census Bureau's safeguards against the release of confidential
data provide a successful example of how such information should be pro-
tected. See Ruggles, On the Needs and Values of Data Banks, 53 MIr& .
L. REv. 211, 218-19 (1968). Although the United States Supreme Court has
not ruled definitely in the area of economic privacy, the California Supreme
Court in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225,
85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970), held that a state statute compelling disclosure of
politicians' personal finances was unconstitutional under both the fourth
amendment and penumbral theories of the right of privacy. The case is
criticized in Comment, Financial Disclosure by Public Officials and Public
Employees in Light of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 18 U.C.L.A. L. Ray. 534
(1971); 49 TEXAS L. Rav. 346 (1971).
75. See text accompanying note 67 supra.
76. Information is a commodity that is sold by credit bureaus, and certain
cases have recognized a property right in names and likenesses of individ-
uals. See, e.g., Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202
F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). The concept that per-
sonal information is property is severely criticized in Miller, Personal Pri-
vacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology in an In-
formation-Oriented Society, 67 Mica L. Rnv. 1089, 1223-26 (1969). Profes-
sor Miller takes the position that property rights, with their attendant legal
history, cannot be successfully grafted onto the right of privacy relating to
personal information. He favors an "information-trust" approach. Id. at
1226-29. However, Professor Miller ignores the possibilities inherent in a
due process use of "property" which would entitle the subject of the infor-
mation to some protection against arbitrary governmental action, a protec-
tion not currently available.
77. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
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of the fifth amendment. When the government releases private in-
formation to the public, the private nature of the information is
obviously destroyed. Therefore, regardless of whether the privacy
of such information is considered to be property or a component
of liberty, the deprivation of that privacy should be governed by
due process. The primary problem created by the Service's pro-
posed amendments is the complete absence of due process considera-
tions. There is no mandatory judicial or administrative deter-
mination of the "need to know" of the person requesting disclosure.
The information is simply open to "public inspection and copying
... [at] the Reading Room of the National Office during regular
office hours."73 The failure to provide for an impartial determina-
tion of the relative interests involved seriously affects the reason-
ableness of the proposed amendments.
3. Ninth Amendment
According to Justice Goldberg's concurring opinion in Griswold
v. Connecticut,7 9 the ninth amendment protects certain unenum-
erated fundamental personal rights against governmental abridge-
ment. 0 It has been intimated l that the ninth amendment is little
more than a security blanket for justices who venture into the un-
charted waters of fundamental rights.8 2 However, it can be equally
argued that the ninth amendment does, in fact, provide an explicit
constitutional statement by the Framers that certain implicit but
unenumerated rights are entitled to constitutional protection. This,
in turn, tends to legitimate the entire process of determining funda-
mental rights and the Court's authority to do so.8
3
381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
78. Proposed 26 C.F.R. § 601.703 (c), 39 Fed. Reg. 43087, 43089 (1974).
79. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
80. Id. at 484.
81. Kauper, Penumbras, Peripheries, Emanations, Things Fundamental
and Things Forgotten: The Griswold Case, 64 MAcH. L. REV. 235, 254-55
(1965).
82. Id.
83. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring). Justice Goldberg applies the same test that is used in deter-
mining which rights are fundamental under the due process clause. Id. at
492-94.
4. Human Experience
In assessing whether a right is fundamental, reference must be
made to the collective "traditions and conscience of our people."8 4
Measured by normal human conduct, privacy relating to personal
financial data meets the test.
One does not readily reveal information about personal resources
without the inducement of a benefit to be gained. The need for
credit, for example, results in an exchange of information in return
for present access to money or goods. The need to support public
expenditures via taxation annually results in revealing the extent
of one's personal financial resources. In the absence of a benefit,
however, people are loathe to disclose such intimate data.85 If one
were to approach a stranger and try to ascertain in detail the ex-
tent of his personal wealth, such a question would be universally
dismissed as rude, insulting, and unworthy of an answer. Yet, the
precise effect of the proposed procedural amendments would be to
allow the government to do that which no individual would do.
An additional consideration is the potential harm that the release
of such information could cause to the taxpayer. Indiscriminate
disclosure of personal wealth could lead to harassment by salesmen
and promoters. Furthermore, the taxpayer or his family could be-
come the victims of criminals such as extortionists and kidnappers.
Unfounded lawsuits induced by the hope of a quick settlement
based on nuisance value are yet another possibility.80
84. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
85. Even when information has been revealed to a credit agency, for ex-
ample, the implicit understanding is that such information will only be
turned over to other persons if they are, in turn, willing to give some quid
pro quo for its use, such as more credit or employment. However, after
an exchange has taken place such as the granting of credit, great concern
is presently being voiced over the threat to personal privacy by such ac-
cumulations of data. See, e.g., Countrymen, The Diminishing Right of Pri-
vacy: The Personal Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEXAS L. Rsv. 837 (1971).
Miller, supra note 76; O'Connor, The Right to Privacy: Bank Credit Re-
ports, 87 BAmc. L.J. 771 (1970). See also TRIA, Jan.-Feb. 1975 at 12-39.
For a discussion of the costs involved in businesses implementing safe-
guards against privacy violations see Goldstein & Nolan, Personal Privacy
Versus the Corporate Computer, 53 HARv. Bus. RPv., Mar.-Apr. 1975, at 62.
86. These hypotheses were advanced in City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v.
Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 270, 446 P.2d 225, 233, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1, 9 (1970). See
also letter from Selig Levitan to Internal Revenue Service, December 13,
1974, which states:
We have in mind actual instances where individuals were in-
volved in applications for rulings and if the information concerning
their financial position became publicly available it takes little
imagination to anticipate how their privacy might be violated and
to what risks their families might be exposed. Id. at 1.
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5. Legislative Action
Governmental protection afforded personal financial information
is additional evidence that the right to privacy regarding such in-
formation is fundamental.87 Disclosure of information contained
in tax returns, for example, is specifically prohibited by statute. 88
The Freedom of Information Act,8 9 the codification of the "public's
right to know," contains specific exemptions90 from disclosure re-
flecting a legitimate legislative concern for the area of privacy. 91
A strong indication that Congress considers the right of privacy
to be fundamental can be found in the recent Right to Privacy
Act,92 passed in December of 1974. In the preamble to the Act, the
right to privacy is explicitly recognized as a fundamental right
protected under the Constitution.9 3 This should dispel any notion
that the Court is sitting as a "super-legislature" 94 if constitutional
protection is extended to the economic information contained in
letter rulings. Although the Act is too recent to have been inter-
preted by the judiciary, the existence of a legislative pronounce-
ment may enable the Court to determine, by reference to statutory
interpretation rather than constitutional law,98 whether the pro-
posed procedural amendments should be allowed to stand.
87. See, e.g., 13 U.S.C. §§ 9(a), 13 (1970) which provide for criminal
penalties upon disclosure of Census Bureau information.
88. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7213 (a) (1).
89. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970).
90. See note 12 supra; Davis, supra note 15, at 783-801.
91. See also Hearings on S. 1791 Before Subcomm. on Constitutional
Rights of Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
92. 13 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 6881 (1974).
93. Id. at 6882. The text reads: "the right to privacy is a personal and
fundamental right protected by the Constitution .....
94. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952).
95. See, e.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring). Because the Right to Privacy Act of 1974 is an amendment
to the Freedom of Information Act, the Court could find that any disclosure
requirements made in compliance with the Freedom of Information Act
must also comply with the Right to Privacy Act of 1974. But see the legis-
lative history of the Privacy Act of 1974 which defines "individual" as a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted
through permanent residence. This term is used instead of the
term 'person' throughout the bill in order to distinguish between
the rights which are given to the citizen as an individual underthis Act and the rights of proprietorships, businesses and corpora-
tions which are not intended to be covered by this Act. This dis-Unction. was to insure that the ill leaves untouched the Federal
I Taken as a whole, the zones of privacy created by specific consti
tutional amendments, the normal course of human experience, and
legislative action serve to establish the fundamental character of
a limited right to economic privacy. Admittedly, this right is not
of the same dignity as the intimate personal relationships in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut9 6 and Roe v. Wade.97 However, the fund-
amentality of unenumerated rights should not be restricted solely
to the procreative process, nor has the Court so determined in the
past.
9 s
Governmental Interests and Alternative Measures
In questioning whether the Service has acted constitutionally,
consideration must be given to the governmental interest in-
volved.9 9 If a reasonable or compelling'0 0 governmental interest
Government's information activities for such purposes as economic
regulations (emphasis added). 14 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
8038, 8115 (1975).
This definition appears inapposite to letter rulings. It is undisputed that
the government may require that information be submitted in the request
for ruling. The true question is whether the government may indiscrim-
inately release the information once it is obtained. To this point, the new
Act is silent.
96. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of marital privacy).
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of bodily integrity).
98. See authorities cited note 63 supra. See also Tribe, supra note 60,
at 42-46.
99. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Note, Roe v. Wade
and Doe v. Bolton: The Compelling State Interest Test in Substantive
Due Process, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 628 (1973).
100. If the Court determines that economics alone is involved, either the
rational relationship or minimal "perceive a basis" test should legitimate the
proposed procedural amendments. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.,
348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 385
(1937). However, where fundamental rights are limited by legislation, the
measuring standard has been that of a "compelling state interest." See
Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406
(1963). The objection may also be raised that invalidating a regulatory
scheme under substantive due process "leaves ungoverned and ungovern-
able conduct which many people find objectionable." Railway Express
Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring),
analyzed in Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In Search
of Evolving Doctrine in a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection, 86 Huv. L. REy. 1, 22-23 (1972). The converse to the above
objection is that if statutes and regulations which intrude on fundamental
rights are not subject to the restraints of due process, this leaves arbitrary
and unreasonable governmental conduct which many people find objection-
able. A middle ground may be to deny that invalidation under substantive
due process leaves the state powerless to act, but instead imposes a duty
to act reasonably when drawing a regulatory scheme intruding on funda-
mental rights. Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965)
which allowed the state to regulate, but not proscribe, the sale and use of
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can be shown for the proposed amendments, the intrusion may be
constitutionally justified.101 However, the government appears to
have no such interest.
Private letter rulings are still considered nonprecedential by the
Service and may only be relied upon by the taxpayer to whom they
are issued.102 Thus, dissemination of the information for tax deter-
mination by other taxpayers is not a present Service concern. 103
Considering the potential harm to the taxpayer involved, 04 grati-
fication of public curiosity hardly seems a legitimate governmental
interest. The only viable reason for instituting the proposed
amendments appears' 0 5 to be the administrative benefits such a pro-
cedure would give the Service. 0 6
By freeing the Service from interpreting what is confidential un-
der rulings and requests for rulings, and eliminating litigation over
that determination, an argument can be made that the Service is
merely allocating its resources in an efficient manner.' °7 However,
the argument lacks substance. 08 The Service could require that
birth control devices.
101. The claim cannot be made that Tax Analysts and Advocates v. Inter-
nal Revenue Service, 505 Adv. F.2d 350 (D.C. Cir. 1974) compels such an
invasion of privacy. The Court specifically held that commercial or finan-
cial information which was privileged could be protected, stating:
We emphasize that there is still available . . . [an] exemption
under § 552 (b) (4) to prevent disclosure of 'commercial or finan-
cial information obtained from a person and privileged or confiden-
tial.' Id. at 355.
102. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201(l) (1) (1972).
103. Of all the proponents of disclosure, none has advocated such a radi-
cal program of disclosure as the proposed procedural amendments would
institute. See authorities cited note 8 supra. But see letter from Tax
Analysts and Advocates to Internal Revenue Service, January 10, 1975. The
letter, rubbing salt into the wound, reminds the Service that past rulings
as well as prospective rulings must be disclosed on the basis of the Tax
Analysts recent court victory.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (6) (1970) relating to "clearly unwarranted inva-
sions of personal privacy" would seem to negate the premise that satisfying
public curiosity about others is a legitimate governmental purpose. See
note 12 supra.
105. The Service has stated no reason other than compliance with the
Freedom of Information Act. See note 4 supra.
106. See U. CHI. Note, supra note 8, at 850-53.
107. See letter from James B. Swenson of Price Waterhouse & Co. to the
Internal Revenue Service, January 23, 1975:
We appreciate that deleting the taxpayer's identity in over 28,000
ruling letters is not practical. Id. at 1.
108. If the Service is already spending approximately 340,000 man-hours
the taxpayer identify the information he considers confidential in
the request for ruling. 0 9 Certain guidelines could be established
to prevent the unwarranted assertion of confidentiality.110 An ap-
pellate procedure whereby the taxpayer could test Service deter-
minations regarding confidentiality should be a component of the
system. Such an appeal could be taken either within the Service
or to the courts."' Computerization of rulings and the information
contained in requests for rulings would also substantially alleviate
storage and retrieval of data problems." 2 A system of deletions
and changes could be instituted for private letter rulings in much
the same manner as is done for the published rulings program.15
Finally, the costs of such a system could be borne by those who
request the rulings" 4 and the information. 15  The presence of
per year on letter rulings, see note 25 supra, it is not clear why the simple
deletion of identity and confidential details would strain the administrative
system of the Service.
109. This has been the most widely advocated method of disclosure. See,
e.g., Reid, supra note 8, at 33, 34; U. Cr. Note, supra note 8, at 849. See
also letter from the law firm of Roberts and Holland to Internal Revenue
Service, January 15, 1975, which states:
The policy of publication under the Act and under the proposed
regulations can be maintained, consistent with the taxpayer's pri-
vacy, and without imposing a substantial administrative burden on
the Service, by permitting the taxpayer to file a duplicate request
from which all identifying data and other confidential information
are deleted. Alternatively, the taxpayer could include identifying
data in a covering letter, which would enclose a request for ruling
from which all identifying data would be omitted by the use of
letter symbols to identify the persons involved. The Service's rul-
ing could refer to the peraons in the letter symbols used in the re-
quest and could be made available to the public in that form. Id.
at 3.
110. These guidelines could be established in a Revenue Procedure simi-
lar to present Service guidelines for submitting a request for ruling on a
corporate reorganization. See Rev. Proc. 23, 1968-1 CuM. BuLL. 821.
111. It would seem naive to think that disputes would not arise, consider-
ing the volume of past litigation over what is disclosable under the Freedom
of Information Act. See, e.g., Developments under the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act-1973, 1974 DuE L.J. 251. It would also appear that ultimately
the courts must decide these questions. See also 12 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5758, 5759 (1974), which contains amendments to the Freedom of In-
formation Act enlarging the role of the judiciary in determining classifica-
tion of documents.
112. A computerized procedure of evidencing private rulings has also
been proposed by Tax Analysts aid Advocates, presumably for different
reasons. See U. CHI. Note, supra note 8, at 849 n.122.
113. See Roberts and Holland letter, supra note 109.
114. See the extensive cost-allocation proposal offered in U. Cm. Note,
supra note 8, at 851-53 & n.127. This program generally provides that the
people who receive the benefit of the rulings program, i.e. the users, should
bear part of the cost of administering it. General statutory authority exists
at present for such a fee requirement. See 31 U.S.C. § 438a (1970).
115. The Freedom of Information Act already contains a provision for
charging those who request information: 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970).
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these alternative procedures substantially lessens the impact of the
administrative burdens argument and increases the likelihood that
the Service's intrusion into personal privacy is constitutionally im-
permissible.'- 6
Unconstitutional Conditions
Assuming that the right to privacy concerning personal financial
affairs is fundamental and that no legitimate governmental interest
exists for invading this privacy, may the Service require a manda-
tory waiver of confidentiality as a condition to the granting of an
administrative benefit?
The Service is under no compulsion to issue private letter rul-
ings;2'1 however, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions s8 pre-
cludes the withholding of the benefit unless constitutional rights
are waived. The doctrine has been applied to such diverse require-
ments as submission to warrantless searches,119 waiver of access to
116. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 636-38 (1969) which held
that administrative convenience was not a sufficient justification for in-
fringing upon the fundamental right to travel. Because Shapiro was an
equal protection case, the analogy to the instant question is not exact. An-
other differing consideration is that the plaintiffs in Shapiro were indigent,
thus arguably involving a suspect classification when fundamental rights
are at stake. However, it would appear to be reverse discrimination if the
wealthy, admittedly the most frequent users of the letter rulings system
(see tax bar interviews, supra note 23), were not granted similar protection
of their fundamental rights. See also Struve, The Less-Restrictive-Alterna-
tive and Economic Due Process, 80 HARv. L. Ruv. 1463 (1967).
117. See Rev. Proc. 3 § 5, 1972-1 Cum. BuLL. 698, 701; Caplin, supra note
9, at 7-9.
118. For a more complete discussion of the development of the doctrine
see French, Unconstitutional Conditions-An Analysis, 50 GEO. L.J. 234
(1961); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35
COLUm. L. REV. 321 (1935); Merrill, Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA.
L. R v. 879 (1929); O'Neill, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits
with Strings Attached, 54 CAIF. L. REv. 443 (1966); Van Alstyne, The De-
mise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 Hv. L.
REv. 1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAav. L. REV. 1595
(1960); Note, Judicial Acquiescence in the Forfeiture of Constitutional
Rights through Expansion of the Conditional Privilege Doctrine, 28 IND. L.J.
520 (1953); Note, Another Look at Unconstitutional Conditions, 117 U. PA.
L. REv. 144 (1968).
119. See Camara v. Mun. Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967); See v. City of Seattle,
387 U.S. 541 (1967). But see Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 324 (1971)
where it is stated that:
It seems to us that the situation is akin to that where an Internal
Revenue Service agent, in making a routine civil audit of a taxpay-
federal courts,120 violations of religious precepts, 12 1 and the invol-
untary disclosure of associations.
122
The basic rationale behind the doctrine is that the government
should not be allowed to do indirectly what it cannot do directly.1 2
Constitutional rights, such as the right to privacy, should not be
allowed to be "manipulated out of existence,"'1 24 yet this is precisely
what the proposed procedural amendments would accomplish re-
garding personal financial privacy. It has been shown previously12 5
that no reasonable governmental purpose may be attributed to the
waiver of the right to privacy regarding personal financial informa-
tion. A balancing of the individual's interest and the governmental
purpose should reveal that the blanket requirement of a waiver is
both overly broad and unnecessarily violative of constitutional
rights.
CONCLUSION
This comment has focused upon both the practical and constitu-
tional defects present in the Internal Revenue Service's proposed
requirement of a mandatory waiver of confidentiality as a condition
precedent to the issuing of a private letter ruling. The primary
er's income tax return, asks that the taxpayer produce for the
agent's review some proof of a deduction the taxpayer has asserted
to his benefit in the computation of his tax. If the taxpayer refuses,
there is, absent fraud, only a disallowance of the claimed deduction
and a consequent additional tax. The taxpayer is fully within his
'rights' in refusing to produce the proof, but in maintaining and as-
serting those rights a tax detriment results and it is a detriment
of the taxpayer's own making.
However, the mandatory waiver of confidentiality contemplated by the
Service is readily distinguishable from the Court's dictum. That the Service
may require the information in the request for ruling is not denied. This
is similar to the proof of a deduction. However, waiver of a statutory
"right" such as a deduction cannot be meaningfully compared with the
waiver of a fundamental right guaranteed under the Constitution, such as
the right to privacy.
120. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922); Insurance Co.
v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 445 (1874).
121. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
122. Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966).
123. Van Aylstine, supra note 118, at 1445-46. Formerly, it was thought
that the greater right to completely withhold the benefit encompassed the
lesser power to condition its receipt upon any terms desired. See, e.g.,
Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924); Davis v. Massachusetts, 167
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practical defect in the proposed amendments is that such a require-
ment may seriously undermine the present program of private rul-
ings which plays an important part in both business planning and
tax administration. The exact defects of the waiver requirement,
while unknown, may prove costly to both the Service and the tax-
payer.
The constitutional defects are that if a taxpayer has an independ-
ent constitutional right to privacy, limited to information which he
would not normally reveal, the release of such information by the
government to interested third parties may constitute a distinct vio-
lation of the individual's right to privacy. On the other hand, the
requirement that the taxpayer voluntarily relinquish his right of
privacy in order to obtain a letter ruling may be an indirect way
of accomplishing the same end and, therefore, equally unconstitu-
tional.
In determining what is or is not constitutionally privileged, refer-
ence must be made to what is considered basic or fundamental in
the American tradition. Analysis of the Constitution, human ex-
perience, and legislative concern indicates that the right to privacy
of personal financial information is a fundamental part of American
life. Therefore, in the absence of a compelling governmental in-
terest on the part of the federal government's release of such in-
formation, its confidentiality should not be violated. Because of
the basic alternatives available to the government and the possible
consequences of the indiscriminate release of the information, no
such governmental purpose has been shown to exist. The basic con-
stitutional faults in the proposed procedural amendments should
be cured by the adoption of procedural rules which protect the con-
fidentiality of the information.
JoHN G. Scnm
